

**ASRS Conference
San Diego, CA
November, 2019**

“1919 and Its Impact on a Century of Religious and Social Transformation.”

**“Exiting the General Conference Presidency:
Heterodoxy, Orthodoxy and Issues of Unity”**

A Paper presented by

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“Exiting the General Conference Presidency”

Abstract

The Bible Conference of 1919 marked a turning point in the General Conference Presidency of Arthur G. Daniells. In that year he was perceived by an increasingly hostile faction in the church to have crossed a threshold of acceptability when at the Bible Conference he had permitted the expression of progressive theological positions, clearly favoring some himself and supposedly undermining the authority of Ellen White. To the conservative faction he was no longer a safe leader. Reaction to the conference had a lasting impact on the church resulting in a highly contentious General Conference session in 1922 involving heated dispute over the presidential election. Daniells exited the office of the presidency under a cloud of suspicion about his lack of orthodoxy. By contrast, thirty-four years earlier in 1888, George Butler exited the presidency in very undignified circumstance because of an excess of orthodoxy. Butler’s defense of a rigid orthodoxy threatened the unity of the church. This paper explores the particular circumstances surrounding the exit from office of the two presidents and then broadens its scope to briefly survey the circumstances involved in the exit of the other occupants of the office of General Conference president since it was established in 1863. Tenures varied with an average tenure of 10.9 years. Most exits were occasioned either by the occupant’s ill-health or the approach of retirement age. Five of the sixteen exiting occupants desired to continue in office but were not returned. Reasons in these circumstances involved either a specific strategic need of the church, discipline or a failure to meet expectations in leading appropriately.

Introduction

It was clear from the highly defamatory propaganda literature circulating around many Adventist churches in the lead up to the General Conference session of May, 1922 that president Arthur G. Daniells was in trouble. His role in the 1919 Bible Conference had become a major reason for deep discontent among angry fundamentalists in the church. In their minds he had stepped across a threshold. Authored by conservative evangelist Judson Washburn and biblical inerrantist, linotype operator, Claude Holmes, the propaganda literature alleged that the General Conference leadership had become heretical and constituted the “Omega” of apostasy.¹ The literature was distributed to the delegates attending the San Francisco session.

Held in the summer of 1919, the Bible Conference had involved many bible and history teachers in the discussion of topics at times considered so sensitive that the transcripts of the

¹ J. S. Washburn, “The Startling Omega and its True Genealogy and an Open Letter to Elder A. G. Daniells,” (1922). C. E. Holmes, “Have We an Infallible ‘Spirit of Prophecy’?” (April 1, 1920). This document is an open letter in pamphlet form. Claude Holmes had earlier been dismissed from his position at the Review and Herald because of his misuse of unpublished Ellen White manuscripts in attacks on church leadership.

discussions had been securely stored in a General Conference vault. Even so, reports of the progressive ideas that had been aired had leaked out and damaging rumors had circulated. Because Daniels had led out in the conference and was the responsible administrator he became the primary target of the fundamentalist anger. “You [Daniells] more than any other one man are responsible,” fumed Judson Washburn. The ugly propaganda and the factionalism that produced it, fanned by the rising winds of a newly energized fundamentalism in the church, may not ultimately have been the real reason Daniels was not re-elected in 1922. He had, after all, been in office 21 years. But the political campaign against him certainly created a highly charged environment that heavily influenced the electoral process and provided the bitter context for a very undignified exit for the president. In Ben MacArthur’s assessment, the charges of heterodoxy and lack of confidence in the Spirit of Prophecy, stoked by deep fears of “higher criticism” among Adventist conservatives prevented Daniells from becoming a truly transformational leader. The criticism scarred him badly and spoiled his reputation at least among conservatives.²

Daniells’s uncomfortable and contentious exit from the General Conference presidency was not unique? In 1888 George Butler also exited the presidency in very uncomfortable and undignified circumstances at another highly contentious session but not because he was perceived to be unorthodox. Rather he was forced out because he was considered too rigidly orthodox and because his approach to the defense of orthodoxy posed a threat to the unity of the church. This paper explores the particular circumstances surrounding the exit from office of the two presidents and then broadens in scope to briefly survey the circumstances involved in the exit of the other occupants of the office of General Conference president since it was established in 1863. The paper seeks to understand what patterns in tenure are evident, what commonalities might be observed in reasons for exiting the office such as health or age and which incumbents desired to be returned to office but were not re-elected. It also gives brief consideration to whether there are evident linkages between reasons for exit and a rationale for the kind of person selected as the new appointee.

² Ben MacArthur, *A. G. Daniells: Shaper of Twentieth Century Adventism* (Nampa, ID: Pacific Press, 2015) 398. MacArthur does not consider that Daniells’ “failure of leadership” in developing a more positive legacy for the 1919 Bible Conference as detracting from his “admirable hopes for change” that were the goals of the conference but that he “faced a situation with complexities beyond his ability to solve.”

Part I: The Agonies of A.G. Daniells' Exit

In the eyes of his opponents, the 1919 Bible Conference meetings served as a dreadful capstone for Daniells' apostasy. The conference was "the crowning act in a program of doubt and darkness." Critics became increasingly vocal and strident in their public criticism labelling the 1919 Conference as "a diet of doubts," and a "counsel of darkness." In the opinion of one of Washburn's unnamed hyperbolic colleagues ("one of our most faithful workers") the 1919 Bible Conference was "the most terrible thing that has ever happened in the history of the denomination."³ But the meetings were not the only clouds that shadowed the last years of Daniells' presidency. Other theological and administrative issues of the day added fuel to the fire of the fundamentalist's anger.

The lingering issue of "the daily" still smouldered. Daniells' quiet advocacy of this new interpretation of Daniel 8.13 and his solid support of other colleagues in his administration who advocated the "new view" such as W. W. Prescott, L. R. Conradi, and bible teachers H. C. Lacey and C. M. Sorenson among numerous others deeply rankled his critics. Defenders of the old orthodoxy saw the chief danger in the new interpretation to be the fact that it undermined faith in an inerrant Ellen White.

The fundamentalist critics of Daniells' administration also vigorously defended the standard "fundamental pillars of prophetic landmarks" such as the interpretation of Daniel 11 and 12 that saw Turkey as the King of the North and Armageddon as a literal battle in Palestine. For progressive Adventist interpreters the old, "sick man of Europe" interpretation of the prophecy had failed. The outcome of the war had made it untenable. As E. F. Albertsworth of Washington Missionary College had pointed out, history was the final interpreter of prophecy and the evidence was now clear. Daniells' conservative critics also objected to new interpretations of the 144,000, the "last Generation" and the new trinitarian Christology that Prescott had promoted. There was general resistance to what they derisively called "the Prescott-Lacey theology."⁴

³ J. S. Washburn to A. G. Daniells May 2, 1922, 14. An insightful overview of the 1919 Bible Conference can be found in Michael. W. Campbell, *1919: The Untold Story of Adventism's Struggle with Fundamentalism* (Nampa, ID: Pacific Press, 2019) which is a condensation of his dissertation: "The 1919 Bible Conference and Its Significance for Seventh-day Adventist History and Theology," (Ph D dissertation, Andrews University, 2008).

⁴ A list of the key issues at dispute in the 1919 Bible Conference is given by Loma Linda Bible teacher N. J. Waldorf. See N. J. Waldorf to L. E. Froom October 22, 1922.

The chief objection to the new theology was that it dissented from the view that the authority of Ellen White was equal with the authority of scripture. In the view of Washburn and Holmes, the two inspired sources were on exactly “the same level.” The Bible was “God's general word, for all time and for every people. The Testimonies are God's special word, for this special time.”⁵ In Claude Holmes’ view, the relationship of Ellen White to the Bible was the same as the relationship of the New Testament to the Old. Both testaments were determinative for establishing doctrine and Ellen White’s writings were no different. Holmes was representative of many. Daniells, along with Spicer, Prescott, Lacey and others, of course, vigorously asserted their orthodoxy and took offense at the accusations that they were undermining the authenticity of Ellen White’s gift even as they asserted that her writings were not equal in authority to scripture nor determinative of its meaning. Holmes and Washburn were the ones in error.

In 1919, the posthumous publication of former Adventist, Dudley M. Canright’s attack on Ellen White in his *Life of Mrs E. G. White: Her Claims Refuted*, further complicated theological perspectives for the church and for Daniells. It became difficult to concede legitimate difficulties and at the same time defend against unwarranted and unjust criticism. Daniells found himself under pressure trying to combine the roles of apologist in chief and progressive. He had also become a marked man because he had come to the defense of progressive teachers at WMC and other colleges at this time. The period after World War I became a time of troubled transitions in Adventist theology. On the administrative side of things Daniells’ resistance to what he saw as an over-rapid expansion of health institutions after the war had also attracted dissent from medical personnel particularly in the Columbia Union. The numerous tensions combined to create dark, poisonous clouds of criticism over the 1922 session.⁶

Earlier Exit Hazards

Daniells had faced the possibility of exiting the presidency several times prior to 1922. He had in fact faced six re-election processes during his twenty-one years in office. At the end

⁵ Washburn, 14.

⁶ MacArthur, 398-408.

of his first year in office (November, 1902) he had confronted an attempted *coup d'etat* from the Kellogg faction that almost succeeded in tipping him out of office and he had fought to hold on to the chairmanship of the executive committee. He felt it was critical for him to stay put in order to steer through the new organizational reforms. He was reported by A. T. Jones at the time as claiming (probably outside of the committee) that he was “not a football; to be kicked into the ring and then kicked out again.”⁷ Again in 1903, he reported that, “in the very heart of a great crisis” some of the Kellogg faction who blamed him for the conflict with the Sanitarium and the troubles in Battle Creek had made another attempt at removing him. He “did not feel very much like being gotten rid of in that way and for that purpose,” he noted, and on that occasion both Ellen White and W. C. White defended him. He was “somewhat relieved” to be re-elected so that he could continue.⁸ There was still the work of organizational reform to be completed and he thought another two years could be sufficient for that. In 1905, Daniells did not object when the nominating committee talked to him again about continuing and he felt then that it must be his “duty” to continue, although he thought at the time that four more years would surely “terminate my position in this part of the work.”⁹ The session that year decided to extend the term between sessions from two to four years.

Approaching the 1909 General Conference session four years later, Daniells fully expected to be replaced. Whether he knew that several conservative minister friends of Ellen White, (S. N. Haskell, J. N. Loughborough and G. B. Starr) had lobbied her in the months leading up to the session encouraging her to secure his replacement because of his support for the new “Daily” theory, is not clear. W. C. White may have alerted him. In any event he chose, in a highly unusual initiative, to speak directly and candidly to session delegates just before his name was voted. He reported that in his talk with the brethren on the nominating committee he had “consented” quite “reluctantly to accept the office again” feeling quite “perplexed in my own mind” as to whether it was really best for him to continue. The 1909 elections were also troubled by theological ferment over the “daily” and the trial of A. T. Jones resulting in the removal of his credentials. A pamphlet with sharp personal attacks on Daniells and Prescott had

⁷ A. G. Daniells to G. A. Irwin, December 12, 1902. *George R. Knight, From 1888 to Apostasy: The Case of A. T. Jones* (Washington DC: Review and Herald, 1987) 189.

⁸ “Partial Report of the Nominating Committee,” *General Conference Bulletin*, May 30, 1909, 212.

⁹ *Ibid.*

been circulated around the tents by evangelist O. A. Johnson alleging that they had both abandoned faith in the Spirit of Prophecy.¹⁰ L. A. Smith had followed Johnson with another pamphlet laden with similar *ad hominem* argument. Following the session W. W. Prescott had been relieved of his office as *Review and Herald* editor at the urging of Ellen White it seems because of the agitation of the conservative brethren over his part in the “Daily” controversy. Colleagues felt he had been treated unfairly. Johnson and Smith continued to circulate their pamphlets widely.¹¹

In 1913, there had been little debate or discussion over Daniells’ re-election but that had been a very complex session with much of the time taken up with Europe under Ludwig Conradi setting up division conference structures with their own constituencies. North America delegates jumped on the bandwagon at the last minute advocating for a similar constituency arrangement for their own division which complicated the session even more and it seems that continuity at the helm was important. Again in 1918, immediately after the war, because the division structures created a distribution of power problem that posed a threat to church unity, there was a reversal of the organizational arrangements of five years previously.¹² Continuity in leadership may again have been an important issue. There was no major discussion over the reappointment of Daniells on either occasion. Re-election at these two sessions was almost routine.

Twice during his twenty-one year tenure Daniells had offered to resign outside of session times. In 1907 he had firmly but gently disagreed with Ellen White over the issue of allocating General Conference funds to the formally independent Madison College, in Tennessee. On that occasion he had stated that he could not in good conscience follow such a policy and offered to step aside if making such payments was considered essential. Ellen White had not taken him up on his offer-cum-threat to resign and the matter was dropped. Again in 1910 Daniells thought Ellen White was suggesting it was time for him to leave office over a misunderstanding about city evangelistic work and he had again offered to resign to make way for another. W. C. White informed him that replacing him was not his mother’s intention and he continued in the role.¹³

¹⁰ O. A. Johnson, “The Daily: Is it Paganism?” (College Place, WA: np. [1909]).

¹¹ Gilbert M Valentine, *W. W. Prescott: Forgotten Giant of Adventism’s Second Generation*, (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2005) 228, 231.

¹² R. W. Schwarz, *Lightbearers to the Remnant*, (Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press, 1979) 374, 375.

¹³ A. G. Daniells to W. C. White, August 5, 1910; W. C. White to A. G. Daniells, August 11, 1910.

During 1920 and 1921, if Daniells is to be believed in the speech that he made to delegates at the 1922 session, he was expecting not to continue in office and that a younger man would be chosen. He reported that during the previous two years he had begun to look forward “to my relief” from the role. Why then did he not withdraw his name from consideration when the session first convened?

Daniels and the Dark Cloud of Heterodoxy

The development of the highly politicized, conservative, public campaign against Daniells prior to the 1922 session changed things for him. The propaganda seriously besmirched his reputation and called into question his orthodoxy. Some of his staunch supporters in various places began to advocate for his reelection primarily in defense of his reputation and his legacy. It is true that they did not see many qualified candidates who could just then replace him. Some suggested that the best way forward was to reappoint Daniells with the idea that Pacific Union Conference president J. E. Fulton would be groomed to succeed him shortly afterwards. (Fulton had had extensive overseas administrative experience). Daniells’ supporters did not want to see him exit the presidency under circumstances of such vicious personal attack and criticism. Nor did he. He left his name in contention.¹⁴

Washburn and Holmes’ propaganda pamphlets with their unauthorized publishing of personal correspondence and other open letters to the President hung heavily over the session making it one of the most stridently political sessions the church has ever experienced. W. A. Spicer who had been General Conference Secretary since 1903 had confided to his wife en route to the session that he was hoping for an assignment to lesser responsibilities.¹⁵ He wanted to be a field secretary with less pressure and the opportunity for more editorial work. He had picked up from conversations on his way to the session through Michigan in late April that at least that region was hoping for a change in leadership.¹⁶ He was astonished, however, at the extent of political agitation when he arrived in San Francisco. “The opposition to Eld. D. filled the corridors

¹⁴ Ben MacArthur, *A. G. Daniells: Shaper of Twentieth Century Adventism* (Nampa, ID: Pacific Press, 2015) 410. MacArthur reports that Mary Daniells also became involved in the lobbying in defense of her husband’s reputation. See D. A. Parsons, “Dan” to B. E. Beddoe, September 5, 1924.

¹⁵ W. A. Spicer to Georgina Spicer, April 20, 1922.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

and halls with gossip and accusation,” he reported to his wife two weeks after arrival in the city. “It was a fright. Old men said they never knew the like.” The propaganda pamphlets had done their work and Spicer found himself thrown into the middle of it.

Politicking among the session delegates in 1922 resulted in a divided and deadlocked nominating committee which, for the first twelve days of the seventeen-day session, could not resolve their indecision over two candidates: Daniells and Spicer. The deadlock also meant no progress on other nominations. Normal session processes simply marked time. According to Spicer’s confidential account to his wife, voting stood at 20 for Daniells and 19 for Spicer for nine days until some foreign delegates eventually shifted their votes and for the next three days Spicer had 26 and Daniells had 20.¹⁷ For the nominating committee this kind of margin was still not a resolution. They were looking for unanimity. According to Daniells, on the floor and in the corridors “hundreds” of church members protested to the leadership against the political campaign. Those that voted for Daniells may not actually have thought it was best that he continue but were simply adamant that the best way to repudiate the unethical political propaganda was to refuse to yield to it and to put Daniells back in office in spite of the politics. Finally on day twelve in a highly unusual maneuver to resolve the deadlock a special “executive session” of only formally registered delegates was convened excluding all other attendees. The politics was openly addressed. The politicking and propaganda campaign was roundly condemned in a proposal put to the floor by *Signs of the Times* editor, A. O Tait. Conceding that individuals, of course, had the right to “express a conviction regarding appointments of posts of responsibility,” delegates, nevertheless, felt it necessary to “pronounce our decided rebuke upon and repudiation of all unchristian propaganda, insinuation and vilification. The “baleful influences” of the minority faction had sought to destroy “the good reputation of honored officials among us.” The effects were “evil.”¹⁸ A window onto the high drama of the session is provided by a report in the daily bulletin that some special morning meetings drew huge attendances when they were given over to discussions establishing the rightful place of the

¹⁷ MacArthur’s account of the 1922 electoral procedures and Nominating Committee problems appears to be unaware of the information available in Spicer’s correspondence with his wife. See W. A. Spicer to Georgina Spicer, April 30, May 20, 1922. The “foreign” delegates were Americans who were serving in overseas missionary assignments.

¹⁸ “Resolution Passed In Executive Session,” General Conference Bulletin, May 23, 1922 240

testimonies in the work of the church. Conservative pastors, George B. Starr, and Frederick C. Gilbert with their inerrantist views of Ellen White and convictions of her “biblical authority” in the church, were the featured speakers at these apparently impromptu meetings.¹⁹

Once Tait’s resolution condemning the politics was approved, the nominating committee reported their voting impasse to the executive session also in a highly unusual development. They presented both a majority and a minority report. On hearing the report, Daniells immediately withdrew his name from consideration. But then Spicer refused to accept appointment. He did not want to be in a position where it might appear that he had sought election because his name had been talked up outside the committee by so many. He did not think it right to hold an office where it would be thought that the propaganda had brought about his election.²⁰ He recommended that the committee look for someone younger outside the existing circle of leaders and then retired to his hotel room for a rest. During the session paralysis, major headlines had appeared in the local and national press over the deadlock wrongly interpreting it as the result of a personal power struggle between Spicer and Daniels through their supporters.²¹

With the political propaganda finally publically and officially rebuked, late in the evening of the day of the executive session, the nominating committee met once again and this time agreed unanimously on Spicer’s name. They sent the chairman to speak again to Spicer insisting that he accept the appointment. After consulting with Daniells and other senior colleagues in leadership Spicer was persuaded to accept nomination as president, albeit reluctantly.²²

According to Daniells, “hundreds” of delegates had agreed that he “ought to be returned as a rebuke to these reprehensible methods used to get me out.” In the resolution of the issue, and as an explicit repudiation of the character assassination and charges of heterodoxy on the part of Washburn, Holmes and their faction, Daniells was appointed as General Conference secretary. The nominating committee agreed that exiting the presidency with dignity was as important to the welfare of the church as much as it might be for Daniells himself.

¹⁹ “The Six O’clock Meeting,” General Conference Bulletin, May 23, 1922, 240.

²⁰ W. A. Spicer to Georgina Spicer, May 22 1922.

²¹ See for example, *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 21, 1922, 5; May 23, 1922, 9 and *San Francisco Examiner*, May 23, 1922, 4.

²² “General Conference Proceedings,” General Conference Bulletin, May 23, 1922, 228.

Daniells held the position of Secretary for four years and then in 1926 took up full-time work promoting the newly established Ministerial Association and the writing of two important books, *Christ Our Righteousness* (1928) and *The Abiding Gift of Prophecy* (1935). His last years were spent on the west coast where he served in retirement as the chair of the Loma Linda Board and as chair of the White Estate. After his bruising exit from the General Conference presidency Daniells gave a further thirteen years of service in senior levels of leadership to the church and his writing helped the church inch forward toward a broader understanding of Righteousness by Faith. In a very mild way against the strong winds of fundamentalism he attempted to help develop an understanding of the work of Ellen White that was more grounded in reality. His critics, Washburn and Holmes, however, did not cease their cry of heterodoxy.²³ The circumstances of his exit from the presidency tell us a lot about the deepening fundamentalist trends in the church he had been leading.

Daniells did not exit the presidency for reasons of age or health even though his tenure in office was the longest of any of the sixteen who have exited the office. It seems, however, that he has been the only president to have exited under a cloud of suspicion about his orthodoxy.

George Butler: The Defender of Orthodoxy

If Daniels' exit was clouded by charges of defending heretodoxy in the church and leading the denomination astray, George Butler, by striking contrast found himself exiting the office under a cloud of criticism for being too rigid a defender of orthodoxy, stifling the growth of the church and threatening its unity. Butler served two terms in the office of President. His second exit in 1888 was a very undignified and unhappy ending to an eight-and-a-half-year term of service. The church-wide theological conflict that he had mishandled and which led to his departure also scarred him badly and led to an exit so humiliating it caused him for a time to withdraw from ministry altogether and to even suggest that his membership should be dropped.

Two years earlier in 1886 when visiting the West Coast, Butler had learned that two editor-teachers he regarded as upstart "young fledglings," had been teaching a new interpretation of Galatians 3.19-24. Furthermore they had been teaching it since 1884. Butler viewed the teaching as a fatal undermining of a foundation teaching of the church. E. J. Waggoner and A.

²³ Ben MacArthur, *A. G. Daniells: Shaper of Twentieth Century Adventism* (Nampa, ID: Pacific Press, 2015) 425.

T. Jones argued that in the Galatians passage, the Apostle Paul had in mind the ten-commandment “moral” law not the ceremonial law which dealt with “particularly Jewish” requirements. What troubled Butler more was that they had “spread their views out broadcast” in classroom, in Sabbath School lessons and in published articles without any respect for “the oldest pioneers” of the message. They had made a reckless “raid” upon the traditional settled view accepted by Adventists and in Butler’s view their activity was subversive and plainly “dangerous.” Uriah Smith, the *Review* editor strongly supported Butler in this assessment. Why was it so dangerous?

Interpreting the passage about the “added law” in Galatians 3.19 (KJV) as the Healdsburg College teachers did, created two major problems for the church. First it undermined a deeply entrenched Adventist apologetic for the Seventh-day Sabbath. In Butler’s view, the implications of Waggoner’s teaching had already precipitated Dudley M. Canright’s 1887 abandonment of the Seventh-day Sabbath. Leading evangelist Canright felt he could no longer defend it and thus he also rejected the Adventist church. Waggoner’s approach, might sound spiritually insightful to the uninitiated, asserted Smith, but it threatened in fact to undo teachings “vital to the existence of our faith.” Butler saw himself called to uphold historic Adventism and to protect the church’s key Sabbath doctrine. It was not a trivial or inconsequential issue.

What also increased the perception of danger for Butler was that he clearly recalled that thirty-four years earlier, in 1854, Ellen White had intervened in this very same dispute over which law Galatians referred to. On that occasion she had declared that the Moral Law interpretation was wrong. Ellen White’s intervention at the time, through a letter read to Joseph H. Waggoner, the younger Waggoner’s father, had persuaded George Butler to change his own mind 180 degrees on the question.²⁴ Butler knew that Ellen White also recalled the content of the 1854 testimony letter because in early 1887 she had cautioned the Healdsburg teachers about their new teaching and did so on the basis of the 1854 letter.²⁵ In Butler’s mind and in the mind

²⁴ Ellen G. White to A. T. Jones and E. J. Waggoner, February 18, 1887. U Smith to A. T. Robinson, September 21, 1892. The interpretation of Galatians 3.24-25 had been discussed in the church in 1854 when it had involved a disagreement between James White and Joseph Waggoner (Ellet Waggoner’s father). Smith and Butler recalled that Ellen White had written her letter to Joseph Waggoner on the basis of a vision asserting that Waggoner had been wrong in his hermeneutics.

²⁵ Ellen G. White to E. J. Waggoner and A. T. Jones, February 18, 1887. She clearly recalled the essence of the letter but had not been able to find a copy of it.

of Uriah Smith, accepting the teaching of the west coast teachers would therefore undermine the authority of the Spirit of Prophecy and cause wide spread confusion. For the two leaders, this was as much a problem as the exegetical problem undermining the Sabbath truth.

From Butler's perspective, the west coast teacher's promotion of the new interpretation had led to "a wide division" in the church letting in a "deluge" which was "injurious to the cause," and had proved "destructive of peace and union." During the three years prior to the 1888 session he had tried to hold the fort in a number of ways. He had labored to enact policies at the General Conference to ensure compliance with the established views and to prevent the spread of the teaching or of any new teaching that the leaders did not first approve.²⁶ He had written a pamphlet on the subject which he had not formally published but nevertheless had sent to a wide circle of church leaders. The pamphlet affirmed the old view and warned of the dangers of the Waggoner position. When Ellen White had rebuked him for "striking" at the west coast men in this way, Butler had felt broken.

In a long letter written just prior to the Minneapolis session Butler reported that in his travels, he had encountered pastors and conference presidents in the Northwest and in other places who were upset over the unorthodox teaching and he informed Ellen White that it was damaging "the prosperity of your Healdsburg College." He had learned that Parents were resolving to "withdraw their patronage" and were reluctant to send their young people to be taught such heresy. Butler was worried because "our other literary institutions," were being affected. If the ideas continued to "be pushed" at Healdsburg, "I shall not give my influence for our young people to attend," he declared.²⁷ He could no longer recommend that students attend Healdsburg. (General Conference presidential unhappiness with west coast schools has a long history.)

Other issues in the church also gave Butler anxiety such as "the worldly spirit," which seemed to be "running riot among us." There was a "lack of spirituality" among many and an "avalanche of dark sins." But it was the departure from orthodoxy in the new teaching on the

²⁶ Such policy restrictions had been adopted at the 1886 Session. "Transcription of Minutes of GC sessions from 1863 to 1888," December 6, 1886, 334. General Conference Archives, Silver Spring, MD. See also "General Conference Proceedings," *RH* November 23, 1886, 728; "General Conference Proceedings" *RH*, December 14, 1886, 779.

²⁷ These observations are made in Butler's October 1 letter to Ellen White.

Law in Galatians “more than any other one thing” that really worried him. And Ellen White’s recent insistence that since he had circulated his own pamphlet there now had to be an open discussion of the issue – in order to be fair to both sides, puzzled and offended him no end. How could that contribute to a defense of orthodoxy? He was sure that “the shaking time for which we have been looking,” had already arrived. Nevertheless, he reluctantly organized a Bible Institute to precede the General Conference session to discuss the disputed matters. The extreme anxiety involved in all this, and his frustrated effort to defend orthodoxy, by late summer, led to a serious breakdown in his nervous health. With the approach of fall weather, a seasonal respiratory illness made things worse.

During the first week of October, from his sick bed, Butler composed his long, thirty-nine page “frank” letter, recounting his frustration and alarm, and he sent it by personal courier to Ellen White. No one else had seen it other than two members of his family. In the letter he recounted his difficulties and his despair, criticized the west coast teachers and found fault with Willie and Ellen White herself for their role in the affair. He saw them making a difficult situation worse. He concluded by suggesting that he did not think he should stand for re-election as president. He had burned out. He was too ill to continue. “I have concluded to withdraw my name from the candidates for office,” he wrote. He was too ill even to attend the Biblical Institute in Minneapolis planned to begin on October 10 a week before the start of the General Conference session itself on October 17. But he held out some hope. This was not yet a formal notice of his standing aside from office. If his health improved, he thought he might “manage to crawl up for a few days during the session.”²⁸ And thus he did not officially withdraw his name.

Ellen White received the letter just as she arrived in Minneapolis on October 9 and she read it with “surprise.” Her first reaction was that it did not have “the right ring.” To her daughter-in-law she noted that it was “a most curious production of accusations and charges against me,” but these did not trouble her. In fact the letter persuaded her even more of the rightness of insisting on an open discussion of the question on Galatians. On Saturday evening she had the entire letter read aloud to her again, this time with a small circle of her advisers around her. Others in the tight senior leadership circle therefore were aware that Butler may not be available for re-election.

²⁸ G. I Butler to E. G. White, October 1, & 8, 1888. The postscript is dated October 8.

Several days later, Ellen White wrote two long pastoral letters replying to Butler and explaining her actions of the past two years. She strongly critiqued not only his bungled approach to defending the doctrinal foundations of the church but his presidency as a whole and particularly his view of the exalted authority he thought the office of president bestowed on him. Though absent from Minneapolis, Butler still exercised a strong polarizing influence on the delegates and during the meetings encouraged a resistance to the new theological insights. He had a large cohort of loyal supporters. This troubled Ellen White deeply. It created a hostile environment and Butler helped it along by sending telegrams appealing to delegates to stand by the old landmarks.

Ellen White told Butler she was sorry that he had “not kept pace with the opening providence of God.”²⁹ She was distressed that he had become a divisive leader, not a unifying leader. He placed value, for example, only on those fellow workers who considered his work and his “way of doing it, all right,” and looked at others “with suspicion.” He had built up relationships with some and not others, thereby creating “strong barriers between God’s workmen.” He was a polarizing leader not one who was effective in bringing about unity. “Those who have marked out a certain course in which the light must come will fail to receive it, for God works in His own appointed way,” she warned the ailing president. She was worried that Butler thought of a brother as “a heretic” even though he had not sat down with him in an attempt to understand his real position and what evidence there was for it. But above all it was his attitude that everyone had to think the same on a biblical issue and that they could be coerced into thinking alike that really troubled her. “Let no man feel that his position as president either of the General Conference or of a state conference clothes him with a power over the consciences of others that is the least degree oppressive, for God will not sanction anything of this kind,” she cautioned.³⁰

Butler’s constricted view of the work also troubled her. She was fearful that the work had grown beyond him. If God had laid a different view of the work on others and granted a different ability, why should Butler feel he had to say “just how that work should be done? Those who do not discern and adapt themselves to the increasing demands of the work should not stand

²⁹ EGW to G. I. Butler, October 14, 1888.

³⁰ Ibid.

blocking the wheels and thus hindering the advancement of others,” she warned him.³¹ His autocratic ways and his stout defense of tradition and orthodoxy was now exceedingly counter-productive. His leadership had brought the church to the brink of schism.

It seems that Butler’s letter to Ellen White with his expectation that he “probably” would not be able to continue in office was not widely known. Most delegates assumed that he would be returned to office. In Butler’s temporary absence from the Session, S. N. Haskell had been appointed as presiding officer. Five days into the session, a letter from Butler was read to delegates that reported his improving health and it seems that there was a sigh of relief.³² The nominating committee waited. Two days later, the regular business was laid aside for the reading of yet another letter from Butler. This time he tendered his formal withdrawal to the somber delegates. “He could not bear “any more heavy responsibilities.”³³ It seems clear that if he had not voluntarily stepped aside he would have been re-elected.

At last, a week into the session the nominating committee could begin to act. They considered the name of William Ostrander, the Colorado president whose only merit, according to Ellen White, was that he was “fully in the confidence of Elder Butler.” Ellen White, however, also pointed out to the committee that there should be objection to Ostrander because he was “unbalanced in mind,” almost like an “insane man” by which she meant he was given to domestic violence.³⁴ Eventually after further counsel with Ellen White, the committee turned to a unifier and a peacemaker, Oles A. Olsen.³⁵ The partisanship that had colored the entire 1888 meetings also spilled over into the nominating committee report. Though Butler was not re-elected president there were those who thought he should still be a member of the executive committee and from the floor of the session the committee’s report was amended to try and accomplish this. The action to get Butler back on the committee by taking Prescott off succeeded by a razor thin margin of 40 in favor to 39 against. A motion to make the motion unanimous failed to get a unanimous vote. Apparently Butler later declined and the president of

³¹ Ellen G. White to G. I. Butler October 15, 1888. The second letter was begun at 2.30 am.

³² “Fifth Day’s Proceedings, Monday October 22.” *GC Daily Bulletin*, October 23, 1888, 1.

³³ “Seventh Day’s Proceedings, Wednesday, October 24.” *GC Daily Bulletin*, October 25, 1888, 1

³⁴ Ellen G. White to J. Fargo, May 9, 1889.

³⁵ Valentine, *Ibid.* 65.

Ohio, R. A. Underwood succeeded him on the executive committee. Supporters ensured, however that he was reappointed to the chairmanship of the Publishing Association and the Battle Creek College Board. These appointments, however, lasted but a short time before Butler moved to Florida to try and repair his health.

Ellen White was relieved at Butler's exit from the presidency. She had come to see that that he had been in the office "three years too long." Commenting to her daughter-in-law on the last day of the conference, she observed that "a sick man's mind has had a controlling power over the General Conference Committee, and the ministers have been the shadow and echo of Elder Butler about as long as it is healthy and for the good of the cause." The nurturing of "evil surmisings" and "jealousies" had resulted in a divisive spirit and the president's authoritarianism and sense of "infallibility" had worked in the church "like leaven."³⁶ Coping with the "case" of the ex-president afterwards might "be difficult to handle" but she and her colleagues were trusting in God.

Butler was deeply hurt by the turn of events at Battle Creek. It was a very undignified and unhappy exit. But in large part, according to Ellen White, he had brought it on himself. He spent the next 13 years of his life as an orchardist in Florida and only in 1903 did he make his way back into the organized work of the church eventually serving again in leadership of the Southern Union Conference

Arthur Daniel's departure from the presidency is of interest because he did not really want to continue in office but felt obliged not to withdraw his name from consideration because of wider issues at stake in the church. George Butler would have liked to continue but his authoritarian ways, the demands of the role and his vision of himself as a defender of the established order burned him out. What do we know about the exit of the other fourteen presidents who have exited the office and what patterns might be observed?

Part II: Other Presidential Exits

Thirty-three regular sessions of the General Conference were convened during the latter decades of the nineteenth Century following 1863 in addition to five special sessions which did not involve elections. For twenty-six years during this period, presidential appointments were for

³⁶ E. G. White to Mary White, November 4, 1888.

one year until 1889 when for a period of twelve years, two-year terms were introduced. After 1905 four-year terms became the norm until in 1970 a five-year term was adopted.

Tenure and Age

The average length of tenure of the six General Conference Presidents who occupied the office during the nineteenth Century was 6.31 years. During this period two leaders occupied the office on multiple occasions. James White occupied the office for three different periods and George Butler occupied the office twice. See chart in Appendix I. From 1901 until the end of the presidency of Jan Paulsen, the average length of tenure for the ten occupants has been 10.9 years with A. G. Daniells being an outlier, serving in the office for 21.1 years. The overall length of tenure of all occupants since 1863 has been 9.18 years. See Appendix II.

Of the sixteen presidents who have exited the office, George Butler faced the most elections (12) followed by James White (10) reflecting the short term of appointment in practice at the time. The average age of incumbents at mid-tenure during the nineteenth century was 49.5. For the ten incumbents during the twentieth century the average mid-tenure age rose to 61.35. Clearly maturity and breadth of experience have been increasingly important criteria to consider in candidates for the presidency as the organizational structure of the church has become more complex. Overall, the average mid-tenure age sits at 55.4. The youngest leader elected to the office was George Butler at age 37 in 1871. The oldest was John Byington at 65 years of age followed by Jan Paulsen at 64. Byington as the first president played a formal ceremonial role even though there was no actual need for much public ceremony. Total church membership at the time was only 3,500 and James White was the *de facto* leader. Paulsen at 75 years of age was the oldest leader to exit the office and his initial election to office had been under unusual circumstances. The average age at election to office is 51.5 across a range of ages 37 to 65. The retirement age of 70 represented in the cases of James McElhany, Reuben Figuhr and Neal Wilson seems to be the age the church considered respectable and appropriate for exit.

Reasons for Exiting

Age and health considerations are equally the most common reasons for General Conference presidents exiting their office. Four left for reasons of health. James White was obliged to exit

his office three times related to strokes, and a resultant inability to function effectively. John Andrews covered White's absence for two years and George Butler for a further three years. Twenty-two year old Willie deputized for his ill father for periods when his health problems were severe enough to make him dysfunctional in the 1870s. William Branson suffered from Parkinson's disease and withdrew after only one term. Robert Pierson suffered a heart ailment and withdrew on the advice of his doctors. Charles Watson suffered painful arthritis and withdrew partially because of health and partially because of frustration and emotional exhaustion with the politics of leadership in Washington even though he was among the younger of the twentieth century presidents to exit the office.³⁷ He was able to continue serving in senior leadership for eight more years back in his home territory of Australia where the politics of leadership were not so complex or intense.

Three presidents stepped aside voluntarily from the office even though they could still have had years of service ahead of them as we have noted in the case of the Australian Charles Watson. John Andrews voluntarily stepped aside in 1870 because James White's health had recovered somewhat and Andrews knew full well that he was really only the acting president. When Ole Olsen stepped aside in 1897 it was the third time he had attempted to do so. He eventually served four terms. Olsen had been called upon to restore a sense of unity in the church after Butler had proved to be a highly divisive leader in his unsuccessful attempts to defend orthodoxy in 1888. Developing systemic problems in the church organization in the mid-1890s posed challenging problems for Olsen as he found himself having to work with a team of associates grappling with huge financial pressures and rapidly expanding organizational complexity. In 1893 Olsen tried to resign but Ellen White forbade him to do so. There appeared to be no one who could replace him. Again in 1895 Olsen suggested to Ellen White that Willie White could and should take his place. She declined. Finally in 1897 he succeeded in exiting the office because Ellen White thought she now had an appropriate successor in line. It did not work out as she hoped. Prescott as her favored candidate was bypassed because he proved too

³⁷ C. H. Watson to A. G. Daniells, April 15, 1932. For further details see Gilbert M. Valentine, *The Struggle for the Prophetic Heritage*, (Westlake Village, CA: Oak and Acorn, 2018), 55-57.

enthusiastic in promoting the reforms Ellen White said were needed. George Irwin, whom Ellen White considered but a “stripling” was elected instead.³⁸

Normal retirement age constituted the reason for exiting the office for six of the presidents (Byington, Spicer, McElhany, Figuhr, Wilson and Paulsen) although two of these had offered to continue in office if needed. Neal Wilson at 70 years of age would liked to have continued in office and thought he should. Thus he left his name in contention. North American delegates, however, felt that twenty-four years under one man (twelve as NAD president) was enough for them and conveyed the idea to other nominating committee members that it was time for a change.³⁹ Delegates were mindful also that the influence of the Wilson family had extended beyond the present incumbent. See Appendix III for details on Wilson family leadership. Somewhat surprised by the resistance to the Wilson name (*Spectrum* editor, Roy Branson described the move as a *coup d' etat*) the 224-member committee turned to Robert Folkenberg after first selecting George Brown of Inter-America, who declined nomination.⁴⁰

Jan Paulsen in 2010, was ready to retire and was of an age to do so. His willingness to continue in office and leave his name in contention was not because he really wanted to continue but because of the deep misgivings he had about the direction in which his likely successor would take the church. The exit of William Spicer, James McElhaney, Reuben Figuhr were all almost routine and the exit from office in each was dignified and their tenure celebrated with genuine gratitude.

Only one president has been required to exit the office of president for disciplinary reasons. In 1999 after eight years of leadership, Robert Folkenberg was found to be involved in financial irregularities that a special committee determined were not in keeping with the high ethical standards for the office of GC President and he was forced to resign. He was replaced by

³⁸ Irwin had been an Adventist for twelve years and had been involved in conference presidency for six years and as district director for two years. Gilbert M. Valentine, *The Prophet and the Presidents*, (Nampa, ID: Pacific Press, 2011) 116, 124.

³⁹ Dewitt S. Williams, *Highly Committed: The Captivating Story of the Wilson Family and the Impact of the Adventist Church*, (Fort Oglethorpe, GA: TeachServices Inc. 2012) 145. See also Ron Graybill, “The Making of a General Conference President, 1990” *Spectrum*, 20:5, August 1990, 10-15.

⁴⁰ Branson wrote that the “1990 General Conference session had less the feel of a constitutionally mandated shift of power than a *coup d' etat*,” in “Editorial Notes,” *Spectrum*, 20:5, August 1990, 3. According to Williams, the first ballot produced a 76:75 split in favor of Wilson with other votes for the other 10 nominees. On the third and final ballot, Brown took 30 votes and Wilson only 81. See Williams, 145.

vice President Jan Paulsen at a special session of the executive committee fifteen months before Folkenberg's second term expired.

Presidents desiring to Continue but Replaced

Twelve presidents withdrew their names from consideration before the session at which they exited the presidency. Three incumbents left their names in contention at the start of the session but withdrew them as the sessions proceeded. On two occasions James White was persuaded by personal circumstances of illness or discussion of health prospects during the session to withdraw his name. George Butler and Arthur Daniells were the other two who withdrew their names midway during a session. Both were unhappy undignified occasions. See Appendices IV and V for lists of reasons for exiting the presidency and circumstances of exit.

Butler had been reluctant to accept initial appointment to the presidency in 1871 to replace White because he feared it would inevitably involve him in unpleasant conflict with his predecessor. As an "apostle," White continued to hover over all presidential operations even when he was not well. Butler's reluctance was also motivated by the fact that the leadership team around James had understood Ellen White to have stated late in 1865 that God intended James to carry the leadership and that he was sure to get well for that purpose. When White's health failed again it posed problems because Ellen White was not able to endorse Butler through any particular vision-based message. He was thus coerced into accepting the office. But in 1875, just as he had intuited at the beginning of his term, he exited the presidency in the midst of a deep conflict with White. He had believed he was actually carrying out "apostle" White's program but White did not see it that way.

Butler's second exit from the presidency in 1888 was, as we have already noticed also an undignified and unhappy ending to an eight-and-a-half-year term of service. Other than the undignified exit of Butler in 1888 perhaps the most personally traumatic exit for an incumbent who had hoped to continue in office was that of George Irwin in 1901. First elected in 1897 two days before the end of the three-week long session that year as a compromise candidate and as a rather inexperienced administrator, Irwin had the unenviable task of leading the church during a period when its systemic organizational failings had become acute. His difficulties were compounded by the increasingly independent operations of the medical work and serious

imbalances developing between the medical and ministerial/evangelistic activities in their demand on the personnel and financial resources of the church. In the power struggle that developed, ugly rumors circulated in church leadership circles before the 1901 General Conference session suggesting that Irwin would be replaced as a result of a conspiratorial plan involving Daniells, Ellen White and her son Willie White. When Irwin took up the rumors with Ellen White she assured him, and others in senior leadership that the rumors of conspiracy were false and the report of a scheme to replace him was a total fabrication. She assured him there was no such plan.

At the 1901 General Conference session, however, Irwin was, in fact, not returned to office when Daniells was elected the new leader. It was a deeply humiliating experience that traumatized him and his family. He was assigned to Australia for four years as a Union Conference president replacing Daniells but eventually made his way back to the center where for four years he joined Daniells' administrative team to serve as Vice President with responsibility for the North American territory. His last three years took him to the West Coast as president of the Pacific Union Conference.

Conclusion

In most cases the process of exiting the office of General Conference Presidency in the Seventh-day Adventist church has been a routine and dignified process occasioned either by the advanced age or perhaps the failing health of the incumbent. But exiting the office has not always been a smooth nor dignified process. On occasion an exit has involved highly dramatic political struggles – not ever it seems between individuals in a personal contest for the control of the levers of power in the church – at least openly. Nevertheless the presidential exit has often been surrounded by struggles over policy, strategic direction and between strong parties and influences in the church. These have involved at times, theological emphases and strong views on what is considered orthodox or heterodox. Subterranean forces have at times quietly and not so quietly struggled for control of the church's agenda and its future direction and these have manifested themselves in the removal of General Conference presidents. The church has survived such unpleasant exits in the past. We may hope that the church will continue to survive them in the future.

Appendix I: General Conference Presidents Length of Tenure and Age

Seventh-day Adventist General Conference Presidents 1863-2020						
Name	Lifespan	Term/s Begun	Term/s Concluded	Tenure	Elections Faced	Age During Tenure
John Byington	(10/08/1797 - 01/07/1887)	05/23/1863	05/17/1865	2	2	65-67
James S. White	(01/04/1821 - 08/06/1881)	05/17/1865	05/14/1867	2	2	44-46
		05/18/1869	02/07/1871	1.75	2	48-50
		08/10/1874	03/11/1880	5.6	6	53-59
				9.35		
John N. Andrews	(07/22/1829 - 10/21/1883)	05/14/1867	05/18/1869	2	2	38-40
George I. Butler	(11/12/1834 - 07/25/1918)	02/07/1871	08/10/1874	3.5	3	37-40
		03/11/1880	10/18/1888	8.6	9	46-54
				12.1		
Oles A. Olsen	(07/28/1845 - 01/29/1915)	10/18/1888	02/19/1897	8.3	4	43-52
George A. Irwin	(11/17/1844 - 15/23/1913)	02/19/1897	04/02/1901	4.1	2	53-57
Arthur G. Daniells	(09/28/1858 - 04/18/1935)	04/02/1901	05/11/1922	21.1	6	43-64
William A. Spicer	(12/19/1865 - 10/17/1952)	05/11/1922	05/28/1930	8	2	57-65
Charles H. Watson	(10/08/1877 - 12/24/1961)	05/28/1930	05/26/1936	6	1	53-59
James L. McElhany	(01/03/1880 - 06/25/1959)	05/26/1936	07/10/1950	14.1	4	56-70
William H. Branson	(08/06/1887 - 01/21/1961)	07/10/1950	05/24/1954	3.8	1	63-67
Reuben R. Figuhr	(10/20/1896 - 10/28/1983)	05/24/1954	06/16/1966	12.05	3	58-70
Robert H. Pierson	(01/03/1911 - 01/21/1989)	06/19/1966	01/04/1979	12.5	3	55-68
Neal C. Wilson	(07/03/1920 - 12/14/2010)	01/04/1979	07/05/1990	11.5	3	59-70
Robert S. Folkenberg	(01/01/1941 - 12/24/2015)	07/05/1990	03/01/1999	8.6	2	49-58
Jan Paulsen	(01/05/1935 -	03/01/1999	06/23/2010	11.3	3	64-75
Ted N. C. Wilson	(05/10/1950 -	07/10/2010				60-
No of Presidents prior to current incumbent				16		
Total Years of Admin				146.8		
Overall Average Length of Tenure				9.18		
Average Length of Tenure - 19th C (6 Presidents)				6.31		
Average Length of Tenure - 20th C (10 Presidents)				10.90		

Appendix II




Figure I: Graph of Tenure in Office




Figure II: Graph of Age Entering and Leaving Office

Appendix III: Wilson Family Central Role in SDA Church Leadership

Wilson Family Tenure as General Conference President = 21 years by 2020		
Wilson Family Tenure in Central Leadership General Conference and NAD – Washington DC	Roles	Years
Nathaniel C Wilson	NAD VP - 1946-1948	2
Neal C Wilson	NAD VP - 1966—1979	13
	GC President - 1979 – 2000	11
Ted Norman C. Wilson	Gen VP - 2000 – 2010	10
	GC President - 2010 – 2020	10
Subtotal: Wilson leadership in Washington DC		46
Including GC Division Leadership beyond NAD + 12 Nathaniel C: SUD (5) AUD (3) Ted NC: ESD (4)		
Total Years of Wilson Family in Central Leadership		58

Appendix V: Circumstances of Exit from the Presidency

Seventh-day Adventist General Conference Presidents 1863-2020				
Name	Circumstances of Exit from Office	Positions Held in Post Exit Period	Further Yrs of Formal Service	Age at Death
John Byington James White	Nominal Appointment yielded to James White Ill health prevents continuing (Stroke) Incapacity prevents continuing (further strokes) Ill health and incapacity resulting from strokes leads to replacement	Lay Pastor None Publishing House Pres Unofficial Counsellor	11 1	88 60
John N. Andrews	Functional "Acting President" during Whites' illness yields to White	Conference President/Editor/First Official Overseas Missionary	14	54
George I. Butler	Interim - during James White's second illness yields to White Theological Rigidity leads to replacement - Polarizes Church	Iowa Conference President Orchard Farming (13 years) then Union President (8 years)	6 8	84
Oles A. Olsen	Inability to effect reform - steps aside after two previous attempts to stand aside.	Union President/Division President/GC Vice President	18	69
George A. Irwin Arthur G. Daniels	Re-Organization Crisis - by passed for new candidate. Political Falout of 1919 Bible Conference - long tenure - conservative campaign to unseat	Division Leader (AUC + NAD) + PUC Pres GC Secretary (4 years) + GC Ministerial Ass. Secretary	12 13	68 74.5
William A. Spicer Charles H. Watson James L. McElhany William H. Branson Reuben R. Figuhr Robert H. Pierson	Retirement because of age - seeks lighter load Stands aside because of illhealth - burdened by church politics Retirement because of age - seeks lighter load Stands aside for health reasons - (Parkinsons) Retirement because of age - seeks lighter load Resigned for health reasons (Heart problem - acts on Doctor's advice)	GC Field Secretary (4 years) AUD President GC Field Secretary (2 Years) None GC Field Secretary (2 Years) Church Pastor (3 Months)	4 8 2 0 2 0	86 85 78.5 70.5 87 78
Neal C. Wilson	Replaced because of age and concern over length of tenure in NAD and GC	Councilor/Local Church Pastor (2)	10	89.5
Robert S. Folkenberg Jan Paulsen	Forced to Resign (Feb 7, 1999) - Financial Impropriety Replaced because of age.	Independent Ministry	0 0	74.9 84+